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Executive Summary 
The Uruguay Round (UR) of GATT negotiations instituted a  new set of rules for 
agricultural trade, embodied in the Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) and its related 
commitments. It also resulted in a fresh attempt to regulate technical barriers to trade, 
primarily through the new Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) Measures and revision of the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement. 
A key outcome of the URAA has been greater transparency. WTO Members imposed 
bound tariffs on their agricultural imports. The URAA established effective constraints 
on existing export subsidies and prohibited new ones. It established new rules that 
distinguished domestic policy instruments by their degree of trade distortion. However, 
country commitments were weak, and the effectiveness and workability of the URAA has 
been relatively untested in that area. 
Many developing countries expressed the concern that they might have difficulties in 
importing adequate supplies of food under reasonable terms during the implementation of 
Uruguay Round reforms. These  concerns were addressed in a ministerial decision 
(NFIDC Decision) that was adopted as a part of the UR Agreement. 
The UR agreements disciplining product attribute measures have clearly reduced 
regulatory barriers to agricultural trade.  However, the current multilateral rules have 
been challenged by events that were hardly anticipated in the last round. 
Current status of agricultural trade policies 
Duties on farm products remain very high, despite UR commitments to reduce 
agricultural tariffs. The global a verage of maximum permitted post-UR tariffs is 62 
percent. By the end of 1999, 1371 Tariff  Rate Quotas (TRQs), that allow certain 
quantities of imports at lower tariffs, had been notified to the WTO covering a wide 
variety of both bulk and processed products. Complex and variable tariffs are still used 
by a number of countries. The URAA allows countries to apply special safeguard (SSG) 
duties to counter import surges for products whose border protection was ‘tariffied’ and 
included in the country schedules. 
Export subsidies are still widespread. Between 1995 and 1998, WTO members spent over 
US$27 billion subsidizing exports. Global expenditures on export subsidies by WTO 
members have been greatest for dairy products  – accounting for 34 percent of the total 
from 1995 to 1998. Officially supported export credits can also act as subsidies if the 
terms of loans are more favorable than those available privately. The use of export credits 
increased from $5.5 billion in 1995 to $7.9 billion in 1998. 
The URAA established bindings on domestic agricultural support that were intended to 
constrain measures that increase domestic prices and distort trade by encouraging 
agricultural production or reducing consumption. Domestic support is highly 
concentrated in a few countries. The European Union, the United States and Japan 
account for 90 percent of total domestic support in the OECD countries. With a few 
exceptions, member countries have adjusted their domestic support policies to comply 
with the Agreement. 
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State Trading Enterprises (STEs) are prevalent in certain countries and markets. Over the 
last several years, notification requirements have been tightened; thirty countries have 
notified the WTO of the existence of nearly 100 state trading enterprises. 
Since the conclusion of the UR, the adequacy of multilateral rules for measures that 
regulate product attributes (health and safety, quality and mode of production) has been 
called into question by new production technologies, disease outbreaks, and demands for 
greater domestic regulation.   
The current negotiations 
The current round of agricultural trade negotiations builds on the legacy of the Uruguay 
Round. Further reform of agricultural trading rules needs to be based on improved market 
access; additional constraints on export subsidies and equivalent practices; and 
clarification of the flexibility that countries have in granting domestic support so that it is 
minimally trade distorting. In addition, countries will need to clarify rules for food aid; 
the use of state trading enterprises in agricultural markets; special and differential 
treatment for developing countries; and rules for product attribute regulation. 
Tariff cuts should be based on a formula that reduces high tariffs as well as lowering the 
average tariff towards that for non-farm products. TRQs should be expanded and their 
allocation made more transparent. Export subsidies should be eliminated by an agreed 
future date. In the meantime, rules should be considered for preventing circumvention. 
Export credit terms should be constrained by agreement, and the subsidy element 
involved in single-desk selling should be controlled. Domestic support should be further 
restrained, particularly that which is considered trade distorting, and the Peace Clause, if 
continued, should be restricted to Green Box measures. 
Improved notification of food aid flows may be needed, but care should be taken that the 
volume of aid does not decline below the quantities needed. Clarification of the place of 
state trading agencies within the WTO should include consideration of competition in the 
markets concerned. The review of special and differential treatment could include the 
continuation of tariff preferences under specified conditions and clearer criteria to qualify 
for special and differential treatment.  
The case for clarifying current WTO rules for product attribute regulations, rather than 
changing them, is strong.  The causes of limited implementation of some aspects of the 
UR agreements need to be diagnosed before effective remedies can be prescribed. Further 
study of the economic effects of nascent measures, such as required labeling of 
production methods, should also be pursued before changes to the rules are considered. 
The packaging of the outcomes in the agricultural negotiations has to reflect balance in at 
least four different dimensions. First and foremost, the outcome has to meet the major 
aspirations of both developed and developing countries. Second, the package has to 
reflect a balance between the interests of importing and exporting countries. Third, there 
has to be balance among commodities. Last, there is need for balance between agriculture 
and other areas. This final element would be easier to achieve if the agricultural talks 
were part of a comprehensive round of trade negotiations. 
iv 
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The Current WTO Agricultural Negotiations: Options for 
Progress
* 
I.  Introduction 
The Uruguay Round (UR) of GATT negotiations was a major step forward in 
international trade relations. Among its many innovations were a permanent trade body, 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), a strengthened dispute settlement mechanism, and 
agreements on intellectual property rights and services. The UR also instituted a new set 
of rules for agricultural trade, embodied in the Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) and its 
related body of commitments, and a fresh attempt to regulate technical barriers to trade in 
the agriculture and food sector, primarily through the new Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures and revision of  the Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) Agreement. Considerable effort was devoted to designing new rules for 
agriculture, and at times it looked like the UR negotiations might break down due to the 
difficulty of achieving agreement. However, in the end, a f ramework for agricultural 
trade emerged which was very different from that which had existed before (see Box 1). 
The implementation period for the UR agreements is now over, at least for the developed 
countries; a new round of negotiations on agriculture started in March 2000. The purpose 
of this report is to review the current state of the UR rules, assess the current situation in 
agricultural trade policy, and analyze options for further reform of agricultural trade. 
II. What was achieved in the URAA? 
A key e ffect of the Uruguay Round Agreement is greater transparency in agricultural 
policies. Notification requirements have created a large body of quantitative and 
qualitative information on agricultural policies in WTO Members. The WTO Secretariat 
has been summarizing this information and making it available to the general public. This 
has made the task of keeping up with the current negotiations easier for those who will be 
affected by the outcome. 
A. Market Access 
The primary test of the effectiveness of the new rules in the area of market access is 
whether countries have implemented bound tariffs, and whether these tariffs have 
remained within maximum agreed (bound) levels. This has generally been the case. With 
a few exceptions, WTO Members have imposed bound t ariffs on their agricultural 
products. The major exception was removed when Japan replaced its quantitative import 
restriction on rice by a tariff in 1999, though Korea has yet to follow suit. A number of 
                                                 
* This synthesis was prepared by Tim Josling, Professor and Senior Fellow, Institute for International 
Studies, Stanford University; Praveen Dixit, Chief, Asia & Western Hemisphere Branch, Economic 
Research Service, US Department of Agriculture; and David Blandford, Head of the Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, Pennsylvania State University. 2 
Box 1:  Accomplishments of Uruguay Round Agreements 
 
Agreement on Agriculture: 
•  converted non-tariff border measures to tariffs and bound all tariffs (i.e., cannot be 
increased without negotiation with other countries) 
•  reduced tariffs by 36 percent (on average) over six years from a 1986-88 base; and with a 
minimum reduction of 15 percent per tariff line (with a 24 percent reduction over ten 
years for developing countries) 
•  established rules for the application of additional (safeguard) duties (up to one-third of 
normal duties) if imports surge or if world prices fall below preset trigger price levels for 
goods subject to tariffication 
•  created minimum access commitments as a share of domestic consumption for products 
subject to tariffication 
•  reduced domestic support---as measured by the total Aggregate Measure of Support 
(AMS) from a 1986-88 base--- by 20 percent over six years. Domestic support considered 
minimally trade distorting (green box) not included.  Direct payment for production-
limiting program (blue box) not included in AMS reductions under certain conditions 
•  banned new export subsidies and introduced constraints on existing subsidies.  Budget 
expenditures for export subsidies reduced by 36 percent, and volume by 21 percent, over 
the 6-year implementation period 
•  Developing countries subject to only two-thirds of the cuts in tariffs, domestic support, 
and export subsidies and over a period of 10 years 
 
Other UR Agreements: 
•  New SPS Agreement established a framework to reduce trade-distorting aspects of 
animal, plant and human health measures 
•  Measures that stipulate production and processing methods are now disciplined by the 
revised TBT Agreement 
•  New TRIPS Agreement extended protection to geographical indicators for agricultural 
products, particularly wine and spirits   
•  GATT 1994 converted plurilateral agreements, such as the TBT Agreement, into 
multilateral agreements 
complaints
1 have alleged that importing countries h ave violated the requirement not to 
maintain, resort to, or revert to non-tariff measures (Article 4.2 of the URAA), where the 
justification has involved balance of payments problems. On the other hand, there are 
many cases, mainly in developing countries, where tariffs applied are below bound levels 
(Tangermann et al., 1997). Only a small number of complaints have been made to the 
WTO that a country has used an import regime in violation of its tariff binding.
2 
The nearly universal binding of agricultural tariffs has not, however, completely 
eliminated measures that resemble the non-tariff barriers that existed before the Uruguay 
Round. In some cases, countries have established sophisticated tariff regimes that act like 
non-tariff barriers. The EU’s post-Uruguay Round entry price regime for fruit and 
                                                 
1 This account of complaints and disputes is based on the document “Overview of the State-of-play of 
WTO Disputes” on the WTO website as of 23 March 2001 (http://www.wto.org). 
2 See Tangermann (2000) for details of these complaints. 3 
vegetables is similar to its former reference price system (Grethe and Tangermann, 1999). 
Variable tariffs used in Latin America have effects similar to variable levies 
(Tangermann et al., 1997). The EU’s “maximum duty-paid import price” regime for 
cereals (also called a “margin of preference”), established at the request of the United 
States as a result of the Blair House II agreement, effectively continues the option to 
impose a variable levy (Tangermann et al., 1997). It is important, though, to note that all 
these policies are not legally inconsistent with tariff bindings agreed during the Uruguay 
Round, and that variable tariffs in Latin America and the EU, are below the bound 
tariffs.
3 
A controversial element of the URAA rules on market access is the Special Safeguard 
Provision (SSG) that protects goods subject to tariffication from surges in imports or 
depression in world prices. However, the SSG has not been used very much, and there 
has been only one dispute involving the provision.
4 Equally controversial is the 
administration of the many tariff rate quotas (TRQs) in agriculture, under which countries 
specify import quantities that incur duties below the bound rates. Except for the banana 
case, which is of a very special nature, only three complaints have addressed that issue, 
but there is probably more dissatisfaction with TRQs than is apparent from formal WTO 
complaints. 
B. Export Competition 
Many observers consider the rules on export subsidies to be the most important element 
of the URAA, by establishing effective constraints on existing agricultural policies and 
the consequent effect on trading conditions. The implementation of the URAA rules on 
export competition should, therefore, be an important test for the reliability and 
effectiveness of the Agreement. Based on this criterion, the URAA appears to have 
worked rather well. 
As far as the quantitative commitment on export subsidies is concerned, there has only 
been one case in which a country flagrantly e xceeded its commitments on the volume of 
subsidized exports or budgetary outlays, and/or granted export subsidies on products not 
specified in its Schedule.
5 
                                                 
3 In the early phase of the implementation of the URAA there was some discussion between the United 
States (and Canada) and the EU about the particular way the EU implemented its variable tariffs on cereals. 
However, the fundamental approach was not in question, only ‘technical’ aspects. The issue was settled 
when the EU adjusted its regime. More recently, Chile’s price band regime was challenged in the WTO, 
but at the time of writing that case has not yet been settled, see Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard 
Measures relating to Certain Agricultural Products, complaint by Argentina (WT/DS207/1). 
4 European Communities - Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry Products, complaint by Brazil 
(WT/DS69). 
5 The country concerned was Hungary, which claimed that it had erroneously overlooked some export 
subsidies that had actually been granted in the base period, and hence had wrongly specified commitments 
in its Schedule. The case resulted in long and heated debates in the Committee on Agriculture, and a 
complaint was brought before the WTO. In the end, Hungary was granted a waiver that allowed it to 
exceed its commitments on export subsidies by given margins, for an interim period ending in the year 
2001. From 2002 on, Hungary will have to constrain its export subsidies to the levels originally bound in its 
Schedule. 4 
For a while there was a debate in the Committee on Agriculture on whether the ‘credit’ 
provisions  in Article 9.2(b) should allow countries to exceed their annual commitments 
on export subsidies if they had ‘underutilized’ them in previous years. This practice was 
finally accepted, and used in a number of cases (particularly by the EU).  
It can be argued that many countries more than fulfilled their export subsidy 
commitments, by applying lower export subsidies than their commitments under the 
URAA, or by eliminating subsidies. Overall, WTO Members utilized less than 40 per 
cent of their allowable export subsidy outlays in the aggregate from 1995 to 1998 (see 
Table 1). It would be wrong to say that the ‘under-utilization’ of export subsidies by 
WTO Members was due to their efforts to make the URAA work even better than 
originally planned. There were many  domestic agricultural policy developments that 
underlay this phenomenon, and high world market prices for some agricultural 
commodities during the URAA implementation period (in particular for cereals in 1995 
and 1996) also helped. Moreover, ‘water’ was contained in the export subsidy 
commitments, since the base period chosen for setting the constraints was characterized 
by particularly large expenditures. However, based on the aggregate quantitative 
experience with the export subsidy commitments, this part of the URAA appears to have 
been successful. 
Table 1: Export Subsidy Outlays: Commitments and Utilization 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1995-98 
All WTO Members             
1 Commitments  mill. US $  21,036  19,800  17,432  12,987  71,255 
2 Notifications 
a)  mill. US $  6,812  7,857  5,931  5,533  26,134 
3 ‘Utilization’ [2/1]  percent  32.4%  39.7%  34.0%  42.6%  36.7% 
European Union           
4 Commitments  mill. US $  14,573  13,870  12,100  8,333  48,876 
5 Notifications  mill. US $  6,058  7,088  5,262  4,849  23,257 
6 ‘Utilization’ [5/4]  percent  41.6%  51.1%  43.5%  58.2%  47.6% 
a) Subsidy outlays reported are not comprehensive for the years 1996 to 1998 as some countries had not yet 
notified their export subsidies by the time the WTO Secretariat produced its background paper. 
Source: Calculated from figures in WTO (2000a). 
It is also important to note that the mere existence of this new type of rule for agricultural 
trade policies, and the expectation that further reductions will be negotiated in the future 
round(s) of WTO negotiations, are important for the domestic agricultural policy debate 
in a number of countries. EU policies are, again, a prime example. Cuts in support prices 
agreed in 1999 were intended to make it possible for the EU to reduce, if not eliminate, 
export subsidies for some products. One of the major objectives of the ‘mid-term review’ 
of the CAP in 2002/2003 will be to reduce further the dependence of EU agricultural 
policies on export subsidies. In EU, and in other countries as well, the rules for 
agricultural export subsidies  established under the URAA have proved effective, and this 
has improved the international market situation. Other countries also changed policies to 
meet export subsidy limits. Canada eliminated its rail subsidies for grains in 1995. 5 
Switzerland began reforms in 1999 to eliminate state trading of dairy products. Australia 
replaced dairy export subsidies with rebates of a new production levy; it eliminated that 
levy in 2000.  
Another important challenge to an agricultural trade policy under the WTO has had to do 
with Canada’s dairy regime, which some countries felt was inconsistent with Canada’s 
WTO obligations, in particular in the area of export subsidies.
6 Though technically rather 
complex, the case essentially involves a producer-financed export subsidy.
7 As this 
practice is not uncommon, the dispute has implications that go far beyond the Canadian 
dairy regime. The issue was whether the price discrimination regime in Canada amounted 
to an export subsidy as defined in Article 9 of the URAA, and hence whether Canada, 
which exported dairy products in excess of its export subsidy commitments, had violated 
its obligations. The panel found that Canada’s regime amounted to a producer-financed 
export subsidy, and the Appellate Body agreed. Canada accepted the outcome, and 
embarked on a process of adjusting its policy. However, a WTO panel recently ruled that 
the steps taken were insufficient; this dispute may go on for some time. 
The Canada dairy case, once it is finally settled, has the potential to contribute 
significantly to strengthening the export subsidy provisions of the URAA and their 
application. Canada has not denied the need to adjust its policy regime in response to the 
outcome of the case. It remains to be seen whether or how the more recently established 
regime will be adjusted again. In any case, the original ruling of the panel and the 
Appellate Body was rather firm, and the defendant country actually started to change its 
policy. One only needs to compare this outcome with ineffective disputes over G ATT 
Article XVI:3 prior to the Uruguay Round to see how much the URAA has improved the 
situation for agricultural export subsidies. 
C. Domestic Support 
The URAA was most innovative in the area of domestic support by establishing new 
rules, which distinguish a griculture significantly from industry. Against this background 
it is somewhat ironic to find that this is the area where country commitments are the 
weakest, and where the effectiveness and workability of the URAA has been least tested. 
Since 1995, in many countries, levels of domestic support subject to reduction 
commitments, as measured by the current total AMS, have remained considerably below 
their commitments (see Table 2). In only two cases was the commitment level exceeded 
in individual years, and b oth were special.
8 In all years since 1995 for which notifications 
are available, around one half of all WTO Members with domestic support notifications 
used less than 60 per cent of their domestic support commitments. 
                                                 
6 Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, complaint by 
the United States (WT/DS103/1), and Canada - Measures Affecting Dairy Products, complaint by New 
Zealand (WT/DS113/1).  
7 The term ‘producer-financed’ is a euphemism, as it is domestic consumers who bear the cost, by paying 
higher prices. 
8 In one case (Argentina, 1995), the point was made that the original Schedule had been established 
erroneously. In the other case (Iceland, 1998), ‘excessive inflation’ was given as a reason. See WTO 
(2000c) and the WTO documents mentioned there in these two cases. 6 
To some extent, the significant slack that exists in many countries’ domestic support 
commitments is due to the use of a generous base period. In the EU, and in the past for 
the United States, it also has to do with the creation of the blue box, which shelters a 
large part of actual support t o farmers in the form of direct payments. In other cases, 
though, the low ‘utilization’ of domestic support commitments reflects policy changes, 
through which support has been decoupled from production and moved into the green 
box. The U.S. Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 is the 
most prominent example. Asian countries, especially Japan and Korea, also made 
considerable changes in agricultural policy in response to WTO commitments.  
Table 2: Actual AMS Levels Relative to Commitments, 1995-99 
Year  Current Total AMS as a percentage of Total AMS 
commitment levels (number of notifications) 
Total number 
of notifications 
(out of 29 as of 
1996) 
  0-20%  21-40%  41-60%  61-80%  81% and 
over 
 
1995  7  2  4  8  6  27 
1996  6  5  2  8  4  25 
1997  5  5  1  5  6  22 
1998  3  2  0  4  4  13 
Source: Taken from WTO (2000c). 
The fact that domestic support commitments have not (yet) proved restrictive may 
explain why there has only been one WTO complaint.
9 That case contributed to 
reinforcing the methodology for calculating the AMS, and in that sense showed that the 
URAA is effective and operational in this area. Another part of the URAA rules on 
domestic support, though, still remains to be tested  – the eligibility of policies for 
inclusion in the green box. There have been no legal challenges to the decisions made by 
countries to place their policy measures in the various boxes. Either the system is 
working rather well or the rules are deemed to have inadequate teeth to make a challenge 
worthwhile. If most countries a re well within their allowable total AMS levels, it makes 
little sense to challenge Green Box policies to have them declared “Amber.” 
To ensure that policies that qualify under the Green Box are not subject to challenge by 
rules that apply to non-agricultural subsidies, the URAA provided for “Due Restraint”. 
The Peace Clause, as this provision is known, specifies that domestic support measures 
that conform to the Green Box provisions are non-actionable and exempt from 
countervailing duties. Other domestic s upport is also immune to certain actions in some 
circumstances. The Peace Clause is scheduled to expire at the end of 2003.  
Developing countries can exempt a somewhat larger set of policy instruments from 
commitment and reduction. It was recognized that g overnment assistance for agricultural 
                                                 
9 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef, complaint by the United States 
(WT/DS161/1), and the related case Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen 
Beef, complaint by Australia (WT/DS169/1) examined by the same panel. 7 
and rural development is an integral part of the development programs of developing 
countries. For such countries, investment subsidies for agriculture and input subsidies for 
low-income or resource-poor producers are  exempt from reductions. Support to 
encourage diversification away from illicit narcotic crops is also exempt. These 
provisions are known collectively as Article 6.2 exemptions. 
If the URAA is judged purely on the basis of the total level of support for agriculture, it 
appears to have had a limited impact. Domestic support levels in the European Union and 
the United States were as high in the late nineties as those in the 1986-88 base period. 
Support for the agricultural sectors of the main developed countries was at levels seen at 
the beginning of the Uruguay Round, although the year 2000 saw a modest decline in 
some countries (OECD, 2001a). There remain key sectors, such as dairy and sugar, where 
adjustments to less production/trade distorting outcomes have yet to take place. For these 
commodities, domestic producer/consumer prices are often high relative to international 
prices. 
The URAA scores somewhat better in terms of the nature of domestic support. The 
Agreement has reinforced the shift from non-exempt (Amber Box) to exempt (Green Box 
or Blue Box) domestic support, even if it has not ensured that total support has been 
reduced. Countries have considerable flexibility under the provisions of the Green and 
Blue Box categories as well as under the  de minimis provisions. An evaluation of the 
impact of the domestic support rules in the URAA must therefore rest on the 
effectiveness of this shift in reducing trade distortions. 
D. Food Aid 
The URAA and a ministerial decision address food aid. Article 10.4 of the URAA states 
that food aid (1) shall not be tied to commercial exports of agricultural products to 
recipient countries; (2) must be carried out in accordance with the FAO’s “Principles of 
Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations,” and (3) be provided fully in grant form 
or meet concessional terms, as provided in Article 4 of the 1986 Food Aid Convention. 
These rules incorporate the use of protocols and multilateral institutions that have 
developed over a long period of time. 
Food aid was one of the concerns expressed by Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing 
countries, who anticipated difficulties in importing adequate supplies of food under 
reasonable terms during the implementation of Uruguay Round reforms. These concerns 
were addressed in a ministerial decision
10 (NFIDC Decision) that was adopted as a part of 
the URA. The NFIDC Decision committed the WTO to: 
•  Review the level of food aid established by the Committee on Food Aid under the 
Food Aid Convention 1986 and to initiate negotiations in the appropriate forum to 
establish a level of food aid commitments sufficient to meet the legitimate needs of 
developing countries during the reform program; 
•  Adopt guidelines to ensure that an increasing percentage of basic foodstuffs is 
provided to least-developed and net-food importing developing countries fully in 
                                                 
10 Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme 
on Least Developed and Net Food Importing Developing Countries. 8 
grant form and/or on appropriate concessional terms in line with Article IV of the 
Food Aid Convention 1986;  
•  Give full consideration in the context of their aid programs to requests for the 
provision of t echnical and financial assistance to least-developed and net food-
importing countries to improve their agricultural productivity and infrastructure.  
   
One problem with the NFIDC Decision is the ambiguity of its language, making it 
difficult for the parties to agree whether or not commitments have been met. The WTO 
reviewed food aid levels and initiated negotiations under the Food Aid Convention 
(FAC). Food aid recipients consider the implementation of the FAC unsatisfactory, as 
donor commitments have declined. Eleven developing countries stated in their WTO 
position paper “Despite the promises, there has been no political will to activate the 
Marrakesh Decision in order to address the problems of net-food-importing developing 
countries (NFIDC). This had been the avenue developing countries had expected to 
receive compensation for the negative effects of liberalization” (WTO 2000b). This 
failure is one reason for reluctance on the part of many developing countries to negotiate 
further reforms (Bridges Weekly  Trade Digest 2000a; Bridges Weekly Trade Digest 
2000b; WTO 2001).  
E. Product Attribute Issues 
During the Uruguay Round, countries negotiated new and revised agreements both to 
increase the scope and the specificity of disciplines on safety and quality regulations.  A 
new SPS Agreement sets out more explicit rules for the regulation of safety attributes; the 
revised TBT Agreement now disciplines measures that regulate production and 
processing methods; and the new TRIPS Agreement extends intellectual property 
protection to geographical indicators (GIs), which are often used to differentiate 
agricultural products in the marketplace. 
The SPS Agreement introduced the most sweeping changes to previous rules.  The 
Agreement reiterates earlier commitments under the GATT to apply technical restrictions 
only to the extent necessary and to avoid unjustifiable discrimination among members, 
but also requires regulators to: 1) base measures on a scientific risk assessment (science-
based risk management); 2) recognize that different measures can achieve equivalent 
safety outcomes (equivalence); 3) allow imports from regions that are free or nearly free 
of pests or diseases (regionalization); and 4) provide notification through the WTO of 
proposed regulations that affect trade  (transparency).  Adoption of international standards 
(harmonization) is encouraged, but not required. Dispute settlement is available when 
WTO countries are unable to resolve differences through bilateral negotiations.   
Several cases brought before the WTO related to product attribute regulations have dealt 
with SPS measures, and provided tests of the application and interpretation of the SPS 
Agreement (Roberts, 1998).  Three of these cases reached the Appellate Body:  the EU’s 
ban on hormone-treated beef, Australia’s ban on salmon imports, and Japan’s testing 
requirements for new varieties of fruit.  The most prominent of these was the hormones 9 
case against the EU.
11
  That case showed the “success” of the SPS disciplines, in the sense 
that the agreement had all the elements necessary to reach a finding on the measure 
concerned; it was also successful in the sense that both the panel and the Appellate Body 
could reach reasonably clear conclusions that the EU had violated its obligations under 
the agreement. H owever, the case was less than successful in achieving changes in the 
measure found to be inconsistent with the agreement: the EU has not changed its policy 
to make it conform to the WTO ruling. One might argue that even that apparent failure 
was not total, since the EU has in principle accepted the verdict, tolerates the sanctions 
imposed on its exports, and is trying to negotiate compensation.  The success of the 
Agreement has been less ambiguous in the other two cases:  both Australia and Japan 
agreed to revise their measures when they were found to be in violation of the SPS 
provisions.        
Beyond the disputes, there is evidence that the SPS Agreement has improved 
transparency, encouraged greater use of risk assessment as a basis for regulation, and 
encouraged animal disease control measures in delineated regions (Roberts, Josling and 
Orden , 1999).  There has been less progress in the areas of equivalence and 
harmonization.  The assessment of measures to determine whether they produce 
equivalent risk  outcomes is generally both time and resource-intensive because 
production practices and the incidence of risks vary widely across countries, and 
countries have been reluctant to allocate additional resources to verify claims that would 
increase imports.  T he impact of harmonization on trade appears to be constrained both 
by the insufficient number and infrequent adoption of international standards.  The 
character of international standards as a public good leads to an expectation of under-
investment in their creation, leading not only to too few international standards, but also 
to too many outmoded standards.  
The impact of the TBT Agreement on the regulation of other quality attributes of 
agricultural products is more difficult to ascertain: no dispute panel reports (related to 
food or any other products) have been decided on the basis of this agreement. However, 
the “mutually agreed solutions” to formal complaints that have been notified to the WTO, 
such as those against the EU’s labeling regime for different species of scallops, indicate 
that the definition of like products and the assessment of whether measures are least trade 
restrictive are likely to be of key importance.   
The application of the TRIPS Agreement to agricultural products appears to be 
proceeding smoothly.  The sole TRIPS complaint related to an agricultural product has 
been made by the United States which claims that the EU’s trade regime for protecting 
the GI “Budvar” undermines legal protection for pre-existing trademarks. 
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United States (WT/DS26), and Canada (WT/DS48). 10 
III. Current Situation in Agricultural Trade Policy 
A. Market Access Conditions 
1.  Border Measures in Agriculture 
Despite the commitments made in the Uruguay Round to reduce agricultural tariffs, 
duties on farm products remain very high. Gibson  et al. provide a  comprehensive, 
comparative analysis of post-UR tariff rates by country and commodity.
12 They estimate 
the global average of post-UR bound agricultural tariffs at 62 percent.
13  
Regional average tariffs for WTO members range from an  ad valorem tariff equivalent of 
25 percent to 113 percent (Figure 1). With the exception of the high tariff region of non-
EU Western Europe (104 percent), the groups with the highest tariffs are composed of 
developing counties: Africa, the Caribbean and South Asia have average bound tariffs 
ranging from 71 to 113 percent  -- all above the global average of 62 percent. 
Representative OECD countries with agricultural tariffs below the global average 
include: Canada (24 percent), the EU (30 percent), Japan (33 percent), Mexico (43 
percent) and the United States (12 percent).   
Gibson et al. aggregated agricultural commodities into 46 groups and found that average 
bound tariffs varied from 50 to 94 percent. The average tariff for eighteen of the groups, 
including tobacco, dairy, meats, sugar, sweeteners,  and several categories of vegetables, 
grains, grain products, and breeding animals exceeded the average for all products 
(Figure 2). Tariffs on the remaining 28 commodity groups fell below the 62 percent 
average tariff. Even the commodity groups with the l owest bound tariffs (i.e., coffee, 
fiber, several fruit categories, spices and live horticulture) have a high degree of potential 
protection with an average permitted tariff of 50 percent. OECD bound tariffs are very 
high in many sectors including dairy (116 percent), grains (78 percent), livestock (82 
percent), and sugar and sweeteners (64 percent). These are the sectors in which some 
OECD countries use megatariffs (defined as tariffs over 100 percent), and in which the 
number of notified TRQs is concentrated. OECD tariffs are relatively low in other 
sectors. Because tariff spikes for sensitive commodities characterize OECD tariff 
profiles, there is a large dispersion, or variation, in tariffs across commodities. 
                                                 
12 The analysis is based on tariff data from several sources, in particular the Agricultural Market Access 
Database (AMAD), a database of post-Uruguay Round bound tariffs, tariff rate quotas, and some applied 
tariffs for about 40 WTO members (available at www.AMAD.org ).  Other tariff data are from the WTO 
Secretariat and UNCTAD. 
13 This simple (unweighted) average of post-UR bound agricultural tariffs includes the ad valorem 
equivalents of specific tariffs which are in some cases very high, and whose values depend on prices. It also 
includes the over-quota tariff in TRQ regimes. 11 
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Source:  Gibson, Wainio, Whitley and Bohman.  2001. 
Non-OECD countries tend to have higher average bound tariffs than OECD countries, 
but with less variation across commodity groups. They have high tariffs for the same 
commodities as OECD countries, except that tobacco,  rather than dairy, has the highest 
average tariff. Non-OECD countries use megatariffs (over 100 percent) more than OECD 
countries. Many of the megatariffs were not subject to reduction under the URAA 
because they were established as ceiling bindings.  
It i s important to note that some of the tariffs actually applied are considerably lower than 
the bound rates in the WTO schedules, particularly in developing countries, For example, 
the 1998 applied rate for Latin American countries of 13 percent is less than one-third of 
the average bound rate of 45 percent.  
Although TRQs were designed to increase market access for commodities that previously 
faced quantitative barriers, high in-quota and over-quota tariffs show that TRQs can 
impede trade significantly. Across all WTO members, the average over-quota tariff is 123 
percent. Five countries have average over-quota tariffs of at least 150 percent. In certain 
instances, the over-quota tariffs exceed 1,000 percent (e.g., the Japanese tariff on dried 
peas). Across WTO members, the simple average in-quota tariff is 63 percent – close to 
the average for all types of tariffs of 62 percent. In general, in-quota tariffs are less than 
50 percent, but a few very high tariffs raise the simple average. TRQ regimes may have 
provided less market access than the architects of the URAA wished. 12 





























Average agricultural tariff (62 percent)
 Source:  Gibson, Wainio, Whitley and Bohman.  2001. 
2. Tariff Dispersion Across Countries 
Tariff dispersion raises two issues. First, non-uniform tariffs introduce relative price 
distortions that can worsen resource misallocation. Second, there is concern, especially 
among developing countries, that tariff dispersion often takes the form of tariff escalation 
– low rates on intermediate inputs (such as bulk farm products) and high rates on final 
products (i.e., processed foods). This results in high effective rates of protection (ERP) 
for value added products.
14 Wainio et al. (2001) find that in both the U.S. and the EU, 
tariffs have a U -shaped distribution over commodity categories that are classified by level 
of processing. Bulk commodities have higher rates of protection than intermediate 
products, with tariffs being the highest on consumer ready items.
15 Japanese tariffs are 
highest on bulk products. Canada appears  to have tariff escalation. However, comparing 
tariffs across broad commodity groups is only a rough indicator of escalation since it does 
not capture input-output relationships among commodities. More research on a 
commodity-specific basis is needed before we can be more definitive on the extent of 
tariff escalation.   
2.  Tariff Rate Quotas 
At the end of 1999, 1,371 TRQs had been notified to the WTO covering a wide variety of 
both bulk and processed products. Although TRQs cover only six percent of tariff lines, 
they are prevalent in sensitive sectors such as meat, dairy, sugar and cereals.  Only 37 of 
                                                 
14 Value added refers to the contribution of primary factors (labor, capital and land) to a sector’s output, and 
can be roughly calculated by subtracting the costs of intermediate inputs from the value of production. 
15 The category of consumer ready items includes some unprocessed products such as apples and bananas. 13 
the 137 WTO members use TRQs. Abbott and Morse (2000) examined tariff-quotas for 
14 developing countries and found only a few cases of binding quotas. Rather, the TRQ 
was applied as a simple tariff (i.e., no over-quota tariff or effective quota). Eastern 
European countries also appear to be using TRQs frequently as simple tariffs. That group 
of countries only enforces 65 percent of their TRQs. A non-applied TRQ would allow 
those countries to raise their tariffs if they were to join the EU.  Norway and Iceland 
account for 322 TRQs, but 90 percent of those are administered as simple tariffs. In fact, 
quota restrictions are applied for only 50 percent of the TRQs notified to the WTO. As a 
result, enforced TRQs are concentrated in a relatively small number of developed 
countries that use them to protect sensitive products.  
The WTO identifies seven different methods of administering TRQ access: applied 
tariffs, first-come first-served, licenses on demand, auctioning, historical allocation, state 
trading importers, and producer groups. Applied tariff administration, allowing unlimited 
imports at the in-quota tariff, accounted for 47 percent of TRQs in 1999. Since this 
method is equivalent to a pure tariff, it has the corresponding benefits of predictability, 
transparency, non-discrimination, and efficient transmission of market signals. An 
applied tariff method is the least distorting because it does not create economic r ents, 
inducing high-cost exporters to enter the market, and the level of fill is determined by 
import demand. The remaining methods of administration are all less desirable, but each 
has strengths and weakness as an allocation device. 
A first-come first-served method allows the earliest imports to enter at the in-quota tariff 
rate up to the quota level. In 1999, 11 percent of TRQs were administered using this 
method. License on demand is a modified version of first-come first-served  – if demand 
for import l icenses exceeds the quota, the amount allocated to each applicant is reduced 
proportionately. This is the most popular administration method, after applied tariffs, 
with 25 percent of the TRQs allocated in this manner. Neither first-come first-served nor 
license on demand distinguishes between high and low-cost exports, and the existence of 
rents may attract inefficient supplies. Historical allocation accounted for five percent of 
TRQ administration methods in 1999. Although market conditions change, this m ethod 
perpetuates past patterns of trade, thereby increasing the risk of under-fill and a biased 
distribution of trade. This method will not ensure that low-cost suppliers provide the 
imports. 
Assigning quota rights to state trading enterprises or domestic producer groups is 
potentially the most distorting method of administering quota; it has not been a frequent 
choice. In 1999, STEs administered two percent of the TRQs; producer groups 
administered one percent.  Both state traders and producer groups have filled their quotas. 
The simple average fill rates under state trading, for the period 1995-98 was 92 percent – 
the highest fill rate of all methods. However, these high fill rates may not reflect 
improved market access, as the trade flows already existed prior to the URAA. While 
quota fill, for existing access, is generally not a problem, the inefficient distribution of 
trade is. Additional market access may not produce such high fill rates and the decision to 
import may not be based entirely on commercial considerations. Imports controlled by 
producer groups can also minimize competition and may adversely affect the quality of 
imports. 14 
Economists propose auctions as the most efficient method to allocate quotas.
16 An 
auction distributes economic rents and p revents high-cost imports from filling the quota. 
In 1999, only four percent of TRQs were administered by auction and fill rates were low 
(under 40 percent in 1995 and 1996). If the transactions costs of participating in an 
auction are high, the tendency for underfill will also be high. 
3.  Variable Duties 
When a bound tariff is significantly above the rate at which tariffs are typically applied, 
an importing country retains discretion with respect to the level of protection. Sometimes 
this discretionary power  is formalized in instruments such as Latin American “price 
bands” and the EU “margin of preference” for grains.  Price bands act as variable-rate 
surcharges, effectively setting a floor on the import price so that applied tariffs can be 
adjusted in response to variations in international prices. Chile, the Andean Pact, and 
Honduras employ price band regimes.  
Under the URAA, the EU agreed to maintain a “margin of preference” for grains, so that 
imports of wheat, barley, rye, corn, and sorghum are subject to  tariffs that maintain the 
duty-paid import price at 155 percent of the EU intervention price. After the 
implementation of Agenda 2000, the maximum duty-paid import price will be 157 euros 
per tonne.
17 Given that the EU Commission adjusts its grain import tariffs every 2 weeks 
in response to changes in U.S. market prices, the mechanism works almost identically to 
a variable levy (Morath 1997).
18 By controlling the duty paid import price, the EU can 
largely insulate its domestic market from world price fluctuations. 
4.  Safeguards 
The URAA allows countries to apply special safeguard (SSG) duties to counter import 
surges for products whose border protection was ‘tariffied’ and included in the country 
schedules. Rules governing SSGs differ from those governing general safeguards in two 
important respects: actions are exempt from the obligation to compensate, and from the 
threat of suspension of equivalent concessions or other obligations (Perkins 1996); and 
SSGs may only be invoked during the reform process as detailed in the preamble to the 
URAA. However, if the reform process extends beyond the initial six-year period 
envisioned in the URAA, the SSG would be available during that extended period. 
The SSG provisions allow the imposition of an additional tariff when certain criteria are 
met  – either a specified rapid surge in imports (volume trigger), or, on a shipment-by-
shipment basis, a fall of the import price below a specified reference price (price trigger).  
For the volume trigger, higher duties only apply until the end of the year in question. For 
the price trigger, an additional duty can only be imposed on the shipment concerned. 
Additional duties cannot be applied to imports within tariff rate quotas. 
                                                 
16 If quota rights could be traded in secondary markets many of the inefficiencies of quotas would disappear 
and the allocation method would be less important. 
17 The value of 157 euros per tonne is 155 percent of the intervention price of 101 euros per tonne. 
18 Where the binding does occur is in the relationship between the duty paid import price and the internal 
price. The fact that grains are now subject to a maximum rather a minimum import price is an improvement 
over the pre-URAA variable levy system. 15 
Of the 137 WTO members that notified TRQs, only 38 reserved the right to use SSGs in 
their URAA schedule of commitments. The percentage of agricultural tariff lines covered 
by SSGs ranges from less than one percent for many developing countries to 9 percent 
for the United States, 12 percent for Japan, 31 percent for the European Union, 49 percent 
for Norway, 59 percent for Switzerland and 66 percent for Poland. The number of tariff 
items that could potentially be protected by SSGs ranges from 10 for Australia to 961 for 
Switzerland. The coverage across product categories reflects the degree of sensitivity to 
liberalization in each country. Product coverage is concentrated in dairy for the United 
States; cereals for Japan; and meat, dairy products, fruits, and vegetables for the 
European Union. The United States declared coffee and tea to be covered by SSGs to 
prevent the entry of sugar in dry or powdered beverage preparations. Switzerland and 
Norway reserve the right to use SSGs across almost all products.  
Despite the broad coverage across products, few SSG actions have been taken. Since 
1995, only the European Union, Japan and the United States have notified SSG actions in 
almost all years. Of 436 price-based actions reported over the five-year period, the United 
States accounted for over one-half, Poland for one-third and the European Union for 
about a tenth. Price-based actions tended to be directed at relatively small volumes of 
imports from specific sources. Of 213 volume-based actions, the European Union and 
Japan combined accounted for over 90 percent, with the E U alone accounting for almost 
60 percent. The European Union used the volume-based SSG for fruits (particularly 
citrus), and vegetables (particularly tomatoes). 
In practice, the SSG provision appears to have been used to balance internal markets by 
the United States, the European Union and Japan. In the case of the United States, the 
application of price-triggered SSG duties on relatively small quantities of individual dairy 
product imports, signaled to exporters that their products would face routinely applied 
SSG duties when trying to gain access to the U.S. market. The European Union used the 
SSG, in concert with other policies and regional agreements, to balance internal markets 
for perishable fruits and vegetables by restricting imports. 
Overall, the special safeguard provisions of the URAA have not been a haven for 
countries seeking to prevent surges in imports. However, for a period after the 
implementation of the URAA, international and national prices for many agricultural 
products were high by historical standards and so would not have triggered efforts to 
limit imports. Only Poland seems to have resorted to SSGs on several occasions to 
counteract inflows of products. The United States has used the price-trigger to place 
duties on dairy products, peanuts and sugar-containing powder and dry beverages. 
B. Export Competition Conditions 
1.  Export Subsidies 
Between 1995 and 1998, WTO members spent over US$27 billion subsidizing exports. 
The EU accounts for nearly 90 percent of the expenditures, Switzerland for 5 percent, and 
the U.S. for less than 2 percent (Table 3). The EU is the largest user of export subsidies in 
both value and volume terms. According to WTO notifications, the EU spent an average 
of $6 billion annually from 1995 to 1998 on export subsidies. Over the same period, the 
EU’s volume of subsidized exports averaged about 28 million tons annually plus 3.6 16 
million hectoliters (95 million gallons) of wine and alcohol. From 1995 to 1998 the EU 
subsidized nearly all of its exports of coarse grains, butter and butter oil, beef, and skim 
milk powder. The majority of wheat and other dairy exports also required subsidies. 
Switzerland subsidizes exports of breeding cattle and horses, dairy products, fruit, 
potatoes, and processed products. Dairy products account for 65 percent of Swiss subsidy 
expenditures and nearly 80 percent of subsidized export volume  – averaging nearly 
US$230 million and 59,000 tons per year. Processed products account for 29 percent of 
expenditures for over US$102 million per year, on average (volumes are not notified). 
Nearly 98 percent of U.S. export subsidy expenditures have been for dairy products 
(under the Dairy Export Incentive Program), just under two percent for poultry, and less 
than one percent for coarse grains (which were subsidized in 1997 under the EEP). 
Table 3. Expenditures on Export Subsidies, 1995–1998, $U.S million. 
  Expenditures  Percent of total 
European Union  24,369  89.4 
Switzerland  1,403  5.1 
United States  406  1.5 
Norway  341  1.3 
Rest of World  728  2.7 
Source: WTO Notifications 
 
The EU and Switzerland rely on export subsidies more than most WTO members because 
they support producers through high internal prices, which stimulate production above 
domestic needs and commercial export possibilities. Both also employ import barriers to 
keep cheaper imported products out of their domestic markets. The size of export 
subsidies change with world price and exchange rate fluctuations, as the price gap 
between the domestic and world price is the per unit export subsidy.  
Global  expenditures on export subsidies by WTO members have been greatest for dairy 
products  – accounting for 34 percent of all export subsidy expenditures from 1995 to 
1998. Beef is the single commodity with the largest subsidy expenditures – 21 percent of 
subsidies, averaging $1.4 billion/year. Grains, sugar ($745 million/year) and incorporated 
products (processed products) together accounted for 35 percent of expenditures.  
Most countries report that their export subsidies have been below permitted maxima. 
During the URAA implementation period, the percentage of both volume and value 
commitments that were filled increased, as permitted levels of subsidization decreased 
and world prices fell. Based on WTO notifications from 1995 to 1998, members came 
closer to filling volume commitments than to expenditure commitments for most 
commodities, even though WTO members agreed to larger cuts in their expenditures. 
Although past WTO notifications have shown that the value limit has been less restrictive 
than the volume limit, this could change if world prices remain low.  
The URAA does not place explicit restrictions on per unit subsidies; consequently the 
size of subsidies has varied greatly across countries and commodities. Subsidy 
expenditures on a dollar per ton basis  have been largest for such high-value products as 17 
alcohol, wine, and fresh flowers. However, those commodities account for less than 1 
percent of subsidized export expenditures and volume. In terms of sectors, dairy has had 
the largest subsidies per ton. One would expect such subsidies to have decreased over the 
implementation period of the URAA, because both permissible volume and value limits 
were declining. The use of the rollover provision mitigated that decline and in some cases 
subsidies increased. Generally, export subsidies trended downward, but it is unclear 
whether this was due to market conditions and exchange rates, or to real reductions in the 
difference between domestic and world prices. 
2.  Export Credits 
Short-term export credit is important to m any international transactions. Governments are 
commonly involved in export credit activity, both for agriculture and for other 
commodities. The OECD and the WTO refer to this government involvement as 
“officially supported export credit”. Government involvement can include: 
§ Public and parastatal agencies (including state traders) that offer credit; 
§ Interest rate subsidies offered by government; 
§ Government assumption of default risk for private loans; and 
§ Publicly supported or subsidized insurance offered to private lenders. 
Default risk guarantees are the most common form of officially supported export credit 
for agricultural commodities. Insurance schemes and credit offered by state trading 
agencies are also used. Explicit interest rate subsidies are uncommon. 
Officially supported export credits are a subject for WTO negotiations because 
“Government supported export credits are seen as a way of circumventing export subsidy 
commitments because interest rates and repayment terms can be easier than under normal 
commercial conditions” (WTO 2001). Disciplines on officially supported export credits 
are likely to be considered in future negotiations on export subsidies; the European Union 
proposes that export credits and other forms of export subsidies be disciplined.  
Officially supported export credits can act as subsidies if the terms of loans are more 
favorable than those that would have been available privately. For example, a subsidy 
element would be present if the interest rate charged does not reflect fully  country risk 
premiums. The extent of the subsidy depends on interest rates relative to market rates 
(appropriately reflecting risk), fees charged, down payments required, and term of the 
loan. The longer the term for a given interest rate, down payment, and fee structure, the 
greater the subsidy element. Since risk premiums reflect default risk (at least in theory), 
the subsidy element of programs that involve default risk guarantees can be gauged from 
the extent to which government budgetary outlays are required to pay off guarantees.  
A recent study by the OECD, based on a survey, provides the most up-to-date 
information on the extent and nature of officially supported export credit programs. That 
report indicates that the use of export credits increased from $5.5 billion and 1995 to $7.9 
billion in 1998. Credits represented 3.6 percent of the value of total agricultural exports in 
1995 and 5.2 percent in 1998. The expansion in use of officially supported export credits 
was likely due to deteriorating financial market conditions, especially the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. The OECD report shows substantially different interest rates, and hence 18 
subsidy values for the beginning of 1998 versus the end of 1998, reflecting the continuing 
financial crisis. 
The  OECD's estimate of the subsidy value of export credit programs in 1998 averaged 
3.6 percent of total export value. There were only four countries for which subsidies 
exceeded one percent: 6.6 percent in the U.S., 3.8 percent in Norway, 3.8 percent in 
France, and 1.2 percent in Canada. Given these relatively small subsidies, distortions in 
trade patterns due to export credits are likely to be relatively small. 
Less than half of the loans offered under officially supported export credit programs are 
for a term of more than one year. More than 96 percent of the loans for greater than one 
year are from the United States. As a consequence, most of the subsidy value estimated 
for these programs is through U.S. programs (88 percent). The European Union accounts 
for seven percent of export credit subsidies, Canada accounts for 4 percent, and Australia 
for one percent. Thus, the potential use of export credits as subsidies is largely a U.S. 
issue. It should be noted, however, that since the 1995 Uruguay Round Agreement the 
United States has relied largely on export credits rather than direct export subsidies (such 
as EEP), whereas the European Union has relied on direct export subsidies. 
Bulk cereals are the most important commodity group subsidized. More than one-third of 
subsidies in 1996-97 went to cereals, and up to 14.5 percent (in 1997) of cereal exports 
received credit subsidies. However, officially supported export credit programs exist for a 
wide variety of commodities. The OECD also notes that most subsidized  credits are 
applied to trade between its member countries. The least developed countries received 
only 0.2 percent of export credits, and food-importing developing countries received only 
8.9 percent of credits. The OECD concludes that disciplines on agricultural export credits 
would not harm poorer food importing countries greatly, because historically they have 
not been major beneficiaries of the programs. The OECD suggests that this is indirect 
evidence that liquidity constraints for such countries are n ot being relieved, and the 
concerns raised in the Uruguay Round Agreement Ministerial Decision are moot. 
However, the same study shows increasing use of export credits during the Asian 
financial crisis, when liquidity constraints were likely to have been binding.  
3.  Export Taxes 
The URAA did not discipline export taxes. Export taxes had not been used by major 
exporters for many years, and it is likely that negotiators believed they would not be used 
in the future. However, in 1995-96, world wheat and barley p rices rose above the EU 
support price for grains. EU exports were drawing down domestic stocks; the EU 
instituted export taxes to prevent domestic prices from rising further and disadvantaging 
domestic end-users such as livestock feeders and millers. The taxes reduced EU exports. 
This was the first time that the EU had taxed grain exports since 1974. Since the EU is a 
large player in world grain markets, reductions in its exports in a time of scarcity resulted 
in a larger global price increase than would otherwise have occurred.  
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland also employed export taxes on grains during 
the URAA implementation period. While support for restrictions on export taxes is 
widespread, developing countries, in particular, support disciplines on export taxes to 
prevent countries from forcing the burden of adjustment onto world markets. An 19 
argument could also be made that discipline on export taxes would limit the exercise of 
market power in trade, but that has not been an important element in the debate.  
Developing countries also employ export taxes. The use of export taxes on primary 
products is, for many of the poorest developing countries, a major means of generating 
tax revenue. Egypt used to maintain domestic cotton prices below the world price, taxing 
its producers, and until 1994 Argentina taxed exports of wheat, sometimes at levels of 25 
percent or more.  
C. Domestic Support Conditions 
The URAA established bindings in the area of domestic agricultural support mainly 
through limits on the  Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS). Reduction 
commitments were intended to constrain domestic support measures that encourage 
agricultural production or raise consumer prices and are therefore considered to distort 
trade (Amber Box policies). 
The URAA also specifies measures not subject to reduction. In addition to the de minimis 
provisions, countries are not required to include direct payments under certain 
production-limiting programs (Blue Box policies) in their total AMS. More widely 
applicable are the exemptions for Green Box policies that are considered to have no, or at 
most minimal trade-distorting effects or effects on production. The Peace Clause 
specifies that domestic support measures that fully conform to Green Box provisions are 
non-actionable and exempt from a variety of actions (e.g., from the imposition of 
countervailing duties). In addition, developing countries can exempt a somewhat larger 
set of policy instruments from reductions.  
1.  Amber Box 
In meeting Total AMS commitment levels agreed in the URAA, members of the WTO 
were required to provide notification of agricultural support to the WTO Committee on 
Agriculture. Domestic support is highly concentrated in a few countries: the European 
Union, the United States and Japan account for 90 percent of total domestic support in the 
OECD countries (OECD, 2001b). With a few exceptions, member countries have 
adjusted their domestic support policies in order to comply with the Agreement. Of the 
Cairns Group countries, only South Africa (97 p ercent) and Thailand (79 percent) were 
close to the limit on support in 1997; Australia was at 25 percent, while Costa Rica and 
New Zealand were apparently providing no support at all through Amber Box policies.
19 
The corresponding figure for the European U nion (average of 1995  - 1998) was 66 
percent, for Japan (average of 1995 - 1998) it was roughly 59 percent, and for the United 
States (average of 1995 - 1997) it was 27 percent. 
One way in which countries have been able to reduce their AMS levels to meet t heir 
URAA commitments is by shifting domestic support from non-exempt to exempt 
categories. Over 60 percent of the domestic support in OECD countries is now excluded 
                                                 
19 The Cairns Group consists of Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Fiji, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and 
Uruguay. 20 
from reduction commitments (OECD, 2001b). The structure of support ranges from New 
Zealand with all of its support in the Green Box category to the European Union with less 
than 25 percent of its support in that category.  
2.  Blue Box 
The EU used the Blue Box for its compensatory payments under the 1992 reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); the U.S. used the Blue Box for its 1995 deficiency 
payments. Japan placed its rice policies in the Blue Box in 1998, replacing the rice 
support formerly subject to reduction in the Amber Box. Other countries utilizing this 
provision include Norway and, in the past, Iceland and the Slovak Republic. In 1995, $35 
billion of blue box support was notified to the WTO, of which 77 percent was in the EU. 
With the elimination of US deficiency payments, the total dropped to roughly $27 billion 
in 1996 – 96 percent of which was in the EU. 
3.  Green Box 
The use of green box measures expanded during the implementation period for the 
URAA. According to the WTO, several countries, including Australia, Canada, Korea 
and the United States, notified new or modified green box  measures. A total of 63 new 
green box measures were notified for 1995-98. In 1996, $127 billion of green box support 
was notified to the WTO. The two leading categories of support were domestic food aid 
(32 percent) and infrastructural and general services (28 percent). Other forms of support, 
such as investment aids, environmental programs and decoupled direct payments each 
accounted for 6-8 percent of total green box support. 
D. Food Aid Conditions 
Food aid is used to alleviate hunger due to natural disaster or political unrest. It is also 
used in development projects such as food-for-work, school feeding, and health and 
nutrition programs. Food aid programs began in the 1950s, due to the simultaneous 
existence of agricultural surpluses in the United States and Canada and both sporadic and 
systemic food shortages in developing countries. Since the 1950s other countries have 
become important food aid donors, and donors differ in the importance of humanitarian, 
producer support and political objectives in their food aid programs (Ruttan 1996; Barrett 
1999; Christensen 1999). Particularly in the United States, food aid has been used as a 
mechanism to dispose of public stocks and as a tool for market development. 
A mix of national and multilateral agencies provides food aid. The United States 
continues to be the largest donor  – in the 1990s it provided 40 to 60 percent of total 
donations. Multilateral agencies have delivered 28 to 42 percent of food aid since 1994. 
Most multilateral aid is delivered through the United Nations World Food Program. 
Cereal food aid averaged less than 0.5 percent of world cereal production, or around 9 
percent of cereal imports by low-income food deficit countries. Actual deliveries exhibit 
substantial variability. Food aid was nearly 13  million metric tons (mmt) in 1994, 
declined to 7.2 mmt in 1996, and rose to 14.5 mmt in 1999. While a variety of foods are 
used as aid, cereals continue to account for around 87 percent of the total (WFP 2000).  21 
For recipients, the role of surplus disposal in donor food aid programs has resulted in less 
food aid during times of global shortages, when prices are high and stocks are low. The 
delivery of aid has been, and to some extent continues to be, greatly influenced by 
availability. The first food aid convention was negotiated in 1967 in an attempt to address 
recipient needs better. The Food Aid Convention (FAC) is a forum in which donors 
commit to provide a minimum amount of aid for a specified period of time. The 1967 
convention guaranteed minimum commitments of 4.5 mmt of food aid. This rose to 7.5 
mmt in 1986, although actual donations exceeded the minimum in many years. In 1999, 
donors to the FAC decreased their pledged commitment to 4.8 mmt – the lowest amount 
since the initiation of the program. It  should be borne in mind that actual donations were 
nearly three times the commitment due to substantial surpluses. Current donor obligations 
under the FAC are expressed in terms of tons of food, not dollars, which should assist the 
maintenance of minimum a id levels regardless of cereal prices. However, in recent years 
the United States has continued its historical pattern of varying food aid donations in line 
with its wheat and other cereal stocks. 
Another factor impinging on the adequacy of food aid is that emergency aid more than 
doubled between 1990 and 1999  – rising from 19 to 43 percent of total donations. The 
increase in complex and long lasting emergencies means that smaller amounts of food aid 
are available to support development objectives. 
Several  developing countries have expressed concerns that the Uruguay Round NFIDC 
decision has not been adequately implemented.  In December 2000, the General Council 
of the WTO instructed the Committee on Agriculture to examine problems facing food 
importing developing countries in this context.  This committee has identified three 
issues in discussion over implementation: a food financing facility and technical and 
financial assistance for improving agricultural productivity and infrastructure. 
E. State Trading Conditions 
The treatment of State Trading Enterprises (STEs) is the subject of on-going discussion 
in the WTO. State trading comes under the purview of the UR Understanding on 
Interpretation of Article XVII, which established a working definition of an STE and 
notification requirements, as well as the URAA, which ensures that such enterprises are 
subject to rules on market access and subsidies.  Over the last several years, notification 
requirements have been tightened, generating information to judge the impact of STEs on 
trade flows. Thirty countries have notified the WTO of the existence of nearly 100 state 
trading enterprises. Because of differing interpretations and ambiguities in definitions, it 
is likely that not all STEs have been notified. STEs are generally used for politically 
sensitive commodities  — grains, sugar, and dairy. This reflects the importance of 
domestic agricultural policy objectives as the raison d’être for this type of institution.  
The prevalence of STEs in agricultural trade has generally been declining in recent years. 
While nearly 90 percent of both rice and wheat trade in 1970s was handled by state 
traders (Schmitz et al. 1981; Falcon and Monke 1979-1980) that share has fallen to 
between 33 and 50 percent today (Abbott and Young 1999; Young 1999). The decline in 
STEs is largely due to the impact of structural adjustment programs. The redistributional 
objectives of these agencies are costly, both in terms of domestic resources and foreign 
exchange, and were factors underlying the macroeconomic imbalances that led to 22 
structural adjustment programs. Pressure from international institutions prompted reform 
of STEs. Many Asian countries avoided the pressures through better management of debt 
and foreign exchange and so less reform occurred in that region. To date, the WTO has 
had very little to do with the reform or elimination of STEs. 
Countries have resisted the elimination of STEs since they are used to implement 
domestic policy. A common reform has been to permit private trading entities to coexist 
with public agencies. In some cases, importing STEs will continue to manage lower 
quality products targeted towards poorer consumers, while private agents handle trade for 
higher quality products. The coexistence of private traders with STEs is likely to lead to a 
reduction in the potential monopoly power of the state trader. However, the state trader 
may retain certain special privileges. Reform of STEs has also been accomplished 
through privatization of existing entities, so that the STEs have autonomy from the 
government. An example of this is the reform of the Australian Wheat Board, which will 
become similar to a producer cooperative, and may be required to operate without 
government subsidization. 
F. Product Attribute Issues 
Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the adequacy of multilateral rules for 
measures that regulate product attributes has been called into question by new production 
technologies, new disease outbreaks, and new demands for agricultural regulation.  Re-
negotiation of t he agreements covering product attribute regulations was not foreseen as 
part of the built-in agenda for the Agreement on Agriculture negotiations beginning in 
2000, nor did any country formally propose reopening them during interim reviews by 
the relevant WTO committees. Yet interest in revisiting the rules has grown dramatically 
in the wake of events that has disrupted the consensus achieved in the UR.  N ineteen 
negotiating proposals sponsored by seventy-four countries have addressed issues related 
to product attribute regulations in the first phase of the agriculture negotiations. 
Several of the events propelling the renewed interest in these measures are well known. 
The emergence of GM products in agricultural markets and a series of BSE and FMD 
disease  outbreaks in Europe have led to calls for the agreements to give governments 
more allowance in regulating risks.  The EU, Japan, Switzerland, and other countries 
favor explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the  precautionary principle and “other 
legitimate factors” in SPS policies, while countries such as the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand favor current WTO rules.  
Some countries are also urging greater accommodation of government efforts to respond 
to a range of consumer concerns unrelated to safety. These  demandeurs would like the 
WTO to recognize explicitly the legitimacy of government regulations that either ensure 
specific attributes, or information about such attributes.  The EU, for example, seeks to 
ensure that trade liberalization does not undermine efforts to improve animal welfare.  
The EU, Switzerland, Japan, and other countries have also proposed that mandatory 
labeling of credence attributes related to production practices, including genetic 
modification, should be explicitly allowed by WTO rules.  WTO recognition of GIs for 
other products (e.g., cheeses, rice) is also advocated by some members.  Several net 
exporting countries, including Australia, Colombia, and Argentina, have stated that they 23 
do not accept any linkages between these issues and the outcome of the agriculture 
negotiations. 
The large number of proposals and statements by developing countries that identify 
product attribute regulations as significant trade impediments has emerged as an 
important development in the current negotiations.  In particular, developing countries 
report that anticipated market access opportunities have not materialized under the 
equivalence and harmonization provisions of the SPS Agreement.  Beyond the question 
of whether the WTO agreements have provided effective solutions is the charge that the 
agreements are part of the problem. Some developing countries have claimed that the 
new obligations under the agreements (related to requirements for risk assessments, for 
example) are diverting scarce resources from investments needed to capitalize on the 
trade opportunities created by the AoA.  These countries therefore have therefore 
proposed extended exemptions from selected provisions of the UR agreements in the 
current negotiations. 
IV.  Options for the Current Talks 
Countries have made a range of proposals for dealing with various elements in the 
negotiations. Rather than discussing these by country, the following section presents a 
summary of the most important of these proposals grouped by topic. 
A. Options for Improvement of Market Access 
1.  Tariff Cuts 
There are many ways to cut tariffs, each involving a different distribution of benefits and 
costs. One technique is the approach used in the first five rounds of GATT negotiations 
of “request and offer”. Using the request and offer approach, participants try to balance 
their “concessions” against those that they seek from others. The problem with this 
approach is that highly protected sectors may be unaffected because they have nothing to 
“gain” in export markets. Request and offer has a tendency to focus on a few sectors. The 
result is that dispersion in levels of protection increases and the reduction in the average 
rate of protection can be modest. 
Another form of sectoral negotiation is the “zero-for-zero” approach. Its advantage is the 
opportunity to increase market access for specific commodities with low levels of 
protection (Meilke, Wensley and Cluff, 2001). This approach is unlikely to open heavily 
protected markets and may even entrench protection, since there are fewer gains to be 
had in return for concessions in sensitive products. On the other hand, the approach does 
allow trade liberalization to proceed, to nearly free trade, in some sectors. 
A final negotiating approach involves formula c uts in tariffs. Formula reductions can be 
as simple as an across-the-board cut of a given percentage in all tariffs over a given 
period, or as complicated as the negotiators’ imaginations allow. The approach can 
produce very different results depending on  the formula adopted. There are two generic 
types of formulas: linear reductions that target the level of tariffs, and harmonization 
formulas that target both the level and the dispersion of tariffs (Wainio, Gibson and 24 
Whitley, 2001). Linear reductions provide across-the-board cuts; harmonization reduces 
high tariffs proportionately more than low tariffs. The problem of tariff dispersion, 
including tariff peaks and tariff escalation, is best addressed through harmonization.
20  
More complex tariff cutting schemes, which Josling and Rae (1999) refer to as a 
"cocktail" approach, can be developed by combining a reduction formula with a set of 
constraints, such as a ceiling on the tariff level and the elimination of "nuisance" tariffs  – 
those below a specified level.
21 Harmonization formulas are flexible enough that 
negotiators can achieve any degree of tariff liberalization they wish. Given the tariff 
profiles in agriculture, a Swiss formula that allows for a ceiling tariff and the elimination 
of nuisance tariffs, w ould seem to be preferable. If this is not possible, the minimum that 
should be accepted is a replication of the UR cuts. By contrast, a “request and offer” 
approach would not be desirable. 
Any formula designed to reduce average tariff levels requires negotiators to specify a 
base period, and an averaging formula. In the URAA, industrial countries bound most 
agricultural tariffs at applied 1986-88 rates. Many developing countries established 
bound tariffs that were well above applied rates. One option would be to start the next 
round of reductions from applied, rather than bound levels.
22 This would remove the 
discretionary element in the current system of bound tariffs. It would reward countries 
that set their tariffs close to the bound level, and penalize c ountries with relatively open 
markets that rely on stabilization schemes such as price bands. The first group primarily 
includes developed countries, while the second group primarily includes developing 
countries. 
A second option would be to use tariffs from the final year of the Uruguay Round cuts as 
the base. However, most WTO members want to start from existing bound rates, since 
countries that have unilaterally reduced tariffs beyond those agreed in the URAA would 
otherwise not receive credit for their  actions. Establishing a new base for tariff reductions 
would be quite controversial; providing credit for reforms undertaken since the UR would 
complicate the process. 
A third and less controversial option would be to use the same base selected for the 
Uruguay Round (Tangermann 1997).  A further extension would be to cut tariffs in 
roughly the same manner as in the URAA. This option would emphasize the continuity of 
the liberalization process and avoid the difficulty of establishing a new base. In the 
Uruguay Round, members exploited the simple average 36 percent overall reduction by 
applying the minimum 15 percent reduction to sensitive products and making large cuts 
                                                 
20 The best-known formula is the Swiss method, which was applied in the Tokyo Round. This formula is 
designed to achieve deeper cuts in high tariffs and to address the problem of tariff peaks. The formula is 
T1=aT0/(a+T0), where T0 is the initial tariff, T1 is the new tariff and a is a parameter that determines the depth 
of cut. The reduction parameter, a, used in the Tokyo Round was 16, but this reduction method was designed 
for initial tariffs that were less than 50 percent (Laird 1998). With the parameter a = 16 a tariff of 350 percent 
is reduced to 15 percent; with a = 60 the reduced tariff is 51 percent; with a = 140 the reduced tariff is 100 
percent. 
21 Wainio, Gibson, and Whitley (2001) evaluate a number of alternative formulas. 
22 This option has been suggested by the US for both the WTO and the FTAA tariff negotiations. 25 
in small tariffs. The avenue of continuing to protect sensitive sectors with minimal cuts 
has become more difficult because there are fewer low tariffs to trade-off in the overall 
average. However, this approach still allows countries to avoid liberalization for some 
sectors. Designing special rules to decrease the dispersion in tariffs resulting from a 
repetition of the UR procedures would also complicate the process. If all nuisance tariffs 
were eliminated without being counted in the overall reduction formula, the approach is 
much more promising and avoids the necessity of calculating  ad valorem tariffs as for 
harmonization formulas.  
Having selected a base period for tariff reductions, another problem is to determine the 
appropriate averaging technique to aggregate across commodity groups. The choice of 
technique is important for establishing overall tariff reduction commitments.  In past 
rounds, targets for the overall reduction of tariffs on industrial products were set as 
import-weighted averages (Laird 1998).  This approach was not used for agriculture, 
where simple averages were used to d etermine the depth of cut.
23 Each of the averaging 
methods: simple average, trade-weighted, and consumption and production weighted 
aggregation techniques has limitations. The minimum 15 percent reduction for each tariff 
line was intended to solve the problems associated with simple average weighting, but 
ultimately allowed WTO members too much flexibility  - it was used to avoid meaningful 
tariff reductions for sensitive products. An alternative way to mitigate the problem of a 
reduction target based on a simple average is to establish a ceiling rate for any tariff.  
Simplification of the tariff structure is a final important issue. The elimination of complex 
tariffs (i.e., combinations of specific and  ad valorem tariffs) should be pursued to 
increase transparency. The use of a single type of duty, the  ad valorem tariff, would 
maximize transparency. 
                                                 
23 Import weights were not used because many markets involved little or no trade because of the prevalence 
of non-tariff barriers. 
Box 2: Options for Tariff Cuts 
•  Employ harmonization (Swiss) formula that establishes ceilings on tariff rates 
•  Bring down average agricultural tariffs to no more than an agreed multiple of the 
average tariffs for imports of manufactured goods  
•  Eliminate nuisance tariffs 
•  Initiate cuts from applied rates or from the final year of the Uruguay Round cuts 
as base 
•  Eliminate complex tariffs and convert to ad valorem equivalents to maximize 
transparency 
•  Ensure that any zero-for zero sector agreements does not entrench protection in 
sensitive sectors   26 
2.  Improvement of Operation of TRQs 
What options are open to countries as they negotiate on TRQs? Two broad suggestions 
are offered here. First, the negotiators should agree that TRQs are a transitional 
mechanism that will eventually be eliminated. Second, the negotiators should make sure 
that all countries abide by the same set of transparent rules in applying TRQs. 
One promising strategy for eventual elimination is t o replace arbitrarily awarded market 
access under TRQs with auctions, and to use the auction prices to establish a true tariff 
equivalent. This could then be used to set the initial, bound over-quota tariff, which 
would gradually be reduced. An alternative approach would be to establish resale markets 
for quota rights. This would avoid the need to develop a potentially expensive 
bureaucratic structure; if resale markets were monitored that would provide information 
on the true tariff equivalents for the products traded.  These options are appealing 
because they would minimize disruptions to markets by gradually reducing trade barriers, 
while at the same time providing meaningful market access opportunities. However, the 
approach depends on the feasibility of auctions or resale markets and might require a long 
implementation period. Tariff equivalents may vary considerably from year to year and 
this might lead to disputes over the choice of an appropriate base period. 
Even if the best long run solution is to  eliminate TRQs, exporting countries that enjoy 
preferential access under TRQs may not agree to their elimination. Operating on one 
component of the TRQ is an alternative approach. A steady expansion of the minimum 
access commitment would eventually eliminate the trade effects of the TRQ. 
Progressively reducing the over-quota tariff would achieve the same end.  Conversely, 
reducing the in-quota tariff may not improve market access. 
If TRQs are not eliminated, tariff reductions only address two of the TRQ’s t hree 
components. Liberalization of the minimum access commitment addresses the third 
component; disciplines on TRQ administration address a closely related concern.  Josling 
(1998) and Anderson (1999) advocate expanding the size of the minimum access 
commitment as the only practical method of overcoming the entrenched protection 
inherent in the TRQ system. Expanding the minimum access commitment is useful when 
imports equal the quota, indicating that there is excess demand for the import. Also, 
quota rents would be reduced.
24 
Rents may increase when a non-binding constraint is relaxed, for example, by lowering 
the in-quota tariff when the quota is binding. Quota rents are important because of their 
potential to bias trade. The rationing of limited supplies and the distribution of rents are 
addressed through TRQ administration, which is judged by two criteria: quota fill and 
bias in the distribution of trade. Market-based allocation methods such as quota auctions 
and unrestricted re-sale of quota rights capture quota rents and remove the incentive for 
biased trade.  Determining the best allocation method to ensure maximum fill when there 
is excess demand at the in-quota tariff is more challenging. Complete fill should occur as 
long as economic rents exceed transactions costs.  Administered techniques  – historic 
access, state trading enterprises, etc.  – may be less complex than auctions, and may 
                                                 
24 With an inelastic demand rents will decline as quota is increased, but with an elastic demand quota rents 
will increase as the import quota is expanded. 27 
involve fewer transactions costs for importers/exporters. However, these methods are not 
responsive to market conditions and may involve less transparent transactions costs, such 
as those due to political preferences. Unfortunately, the best choice of quota 
administration method, in the face of transactions costs, is specific to the product that is 
being traded. 
There is g eneral agreement that the base period for the minimum access commitments 
should be updated and made uniform across countries. In the URAA the "guideline" for 
minimum access was 3 percent of domestic consumption, rising to 5 percent of domestic 
consumption. However, many countries did not apply this guideline. Hence, a new set of 
domestic consumption figures and current access commitments, as a percent of domestic 
consumption, should be developed so that all countries are working from a common base 
for minimum access commitments. Simultaneously, negotiators will have to determine 
the level of product aggregation to which these commitments will apply. 
3.  Special Safeguards 
In almost all WTO members, some sectors are politically sensitive, and members 
reserved the right to take action quickly through the Special Safeguards (SSG) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture if imports threaten domestic producers. The first issue is 
whether the SSG should be continued. One interpretation of the URAA is that the 
safeguard will continue as long as the reform processes continues, and so will continue if 
further reform is undertaken.  
Opponents of extending the SSG point to the “emergency safeguard” (Article XIX) 
provisions that allow members to take action if increased imports cause  or threaten to 
cause serious injury to a domestic industry. They argue that this safeguard is sufficient 
for agricultural trade. They see the elimination of SSG as an important step towards 
subjecting agricultural trade to the same rules that apply to other goods.  
A further view is that SSG is essential for achieving agreement on further trade 
liberalization. The political reality of agricultural reform in many countries is that 
stakeholders demand some discretionary control of trade flows. They need assurance that  
Box 3: Options for Improvements in TRQs 
 
•  Establish the level of product aggregation and a common base period for 
minimum access commitments 
•  Expand access to a common percentage of domestic consumption with no 
exceptions 
•  Establish transparent procedures for quota allocation with auction or resale 
markets in import quota rights 
•  Apply tariff reductions to both in-quota and over-quota tariffs. 28 
Box 4: Options for Reforms on Special Safeguards (SSG) 
•  Consider eliminating SSG and use WTO safeguards instead 
•  Make SSG available to all commodities and countries uniformly, including 
seasonable and perishable products 
•  Limit tariff increases and the period of application of SSG, with renewals and 
applications subject to review under the WTO 
•  Make SSG conditional on forgoing other variable tariff schemes 
action can be taken, if necessary, to counter large, price-depressing inflows of products. 
Given that a SSG is inherently distorting, accepting the mechanism as a compromise to 
obtain further tariff liberalization requires rules to ensure that SSG does not become more 
distorting than the measures it replaces. To this end, providing smaller offsets (tariff 
increases) for a fall in domestic prices, or shortening the period for the quantity trigger 
would tighten the current criteria. Negotiators should attempt to keep the mechanism as 
transparent as possible, so that affected parties are provided adequate notification and 
information about additional duties. The use of the SSG should be time limited and 
regulated, with renewals and extensions judged  by a technical committee comprised of a 
third party representative, and possibly involving an injury test. 
Proponents of an agricultural SSG point to the level of transparency that is achieved if 
nations use a safeguard rather than price bands – reference prices and applied tariffs that 
vary with changes in import prices (Josling and Rae, 1999). Nations would retain the 
right to take prescribed actions, but would forgo the use of trade distorting policy 
instruments, such as the EU reference price system. T his use of an agricultural SSG could 
contribute significantly to a compromise in the negotiations: transparency of action is the 
cost of maintaining discretionary control of imports. 
 
B. Options for Improvement of Export Competition 
1.  Export Subsidies 
The inclusion of disciplines on export subsidies was a major accomplishment of the 
URAA. Some argue that base period levels may not have been representative of 
subsidized export flows in the early 1990s, and may have actually encouraged an increase 
in subsidized exports during the implementation period. However, the initial bindings 
encouraged countries, such as the EU, to sign the URAA. One option available for the 
current round is to initiate cuts in permitted expenditures and volumes from the final 
2000–01 bound levels. Some economists have argued for additional cuts at the same pace 
of the URAA implementation period. Though export subsidies would still exist, such cuts 
would require significant policy reforms in the countries that employ export subsidies, 
and would be a major step towards export subsidy elimination. 
The use of both value and volume commitments constrains export subsidies in times of 
both high and low prices. When world prices are low, the value limit becomes more 29 
constraining because the wedge between the domestic support price and the competitive 
export price becomes larger. Volume limits prevent exports of excess supply when there 
are low domestic prices. When world prices are high, the value constraint becomes less 
binding but the volume constraint can still be effective. Therefore, limits on both value 
and volume weaken the ability of export subsidies to maintain fixed internal price 
supports. Further restrictions on export subsidies are likely to encourage reductions in the 
domestic price supports that encourage surplus production.
25 
One proposal that has been promoted and which affects export subsidy disciplines is the 
so-called “zero-for-zero” option. Under a zero-for-zero agreement, all members would 
eliminate support, including export subsidies, for a single commodity or a group of 
commodities. Based on WTO notifications, the only commodity group for which a zero-
for-zero program is unlikely to undermine export subsidies is oilcakes. No country 
notified subsidized exports of oilcakes from 1995 to 1998. Other commodities where 
zero-for-zero would be feasible in terms of export subsidies would be cotton and oilseeds. 
However, countries may be reluctant to give up the option of subsidizing their exports in 
the future. Unless countries are given the opportunity to select one or two commodities 
for which they would be willing to give up the use of export subsidies, a zero-for-zero 
program would most likely not be viable.  The zero-for-zero option is unlikely to be 
attractive to the European Union, the major user of export subsidies. 
 
2.  Export Credits 
Research on officially supported agricultural export credits has raised several issues. 
These relate to the extent to which export credit programs contain subsidies, the extent to 
which they distort trade, and how disciplines on credit programs would limit distortions. 
Understanding these issues should condition negotiations on export credit programs. 
The estimated subsidy value of existing programs is relatively low. Only for U.S. 
programs are subsidy values above four percent, and credit terms longer than one year. In 
all cases, the relatively low subsidies are likely to create small trade distortions. Evidence 
                                                 
25 Some countries argue that market promotion activities should be subject to export subsidy disciplines. 
However, Article 9, Section 1d exempts widely used export promotion and advisory services from export 
subsidy reduction commitments.  
Box 5: Options for Reforms in Export Subsidies  
 
•  Agree to the elimination of all export subsidies by a date certain 
•  Further reduce bindings on the volume and value of export subsidies 
•  Consider rules to prevent circumvention (such as EU component subsidies) 
•  Eliminate the ability to “rollover” unused subsidies to future years  
•  Revisit the definition of export subsidies to account for consumer-financed 
subsidies and cross subsidization across commodities 30 
from the literature suggests that programs may create additional demand, and to the 
extent that this is true their negative impact on competing exporters is likely minimal. 
Disciplining officially supported export credit programs is more likely to be 
accomplished by limiting the term of loans offered, and by constraining government 
budgetary outlays, rather than by constraining program parameters such as minimum 
interest rate requirements. Constraining interest rates or other program parameters risks 
interfering with commercial relationships, may negate the value of a program to the 
importers, and limit additionality. 
Difficult issues arise where credit programs overlap other forms of subsidies, such as 
food aid. Special and differential treatment of credit programs for developing countries is 
mandated in the Uruguay Round Agreement. This could more effectively target liquidity 
constraints and generate additional demand.  
  
C. Options for Reform of Domestic Support 
Country proposals suggest that domestic support is likely to be among the most 
contentious elements of the agricultural negotiations. Proposals highlight a range of 
issues, including reductions in aggregate support (including definition and criteria for 
exempt policies; consideration of inflation and exchange rate changes; the role of  de 
minimis provisions; and total versus product-specific AMS  commitments); the 
accommodation of “non-trade” concerns; the role of the Blue Box; limits on Green Box 
subsidies; the role of the Peace Clause; and special and differential treatment.  
One of the challenges for the negotiations is to identify ways to reduce trade-distorting 
domestic support while providing countries with the flexibility to achieve important 
societal goals. The urgency of this issue will increase as the amount of support allowed 
within the Amber and Blue Boxes declines. Criteria must be refined to provide clearer 
definitions of acceptable minimal-trade-distorting domestic policy measures that allow 
countries to pursue important societal objectives, such as those concerning environmental 
standards, rural development, food security and poverty alleviation. 
1.  Further Reductions in AMS 
The URAA placed limits on individual countries’ total AMS and specified reductions, 
resulting in a final, bound support level. Issues for the current negotiations are how much 
further to reduce those levels, and whether or not to use the bound support level as a base 
for further reduction. The bound AMS varies greatly among countries, with most having 
a zero commitment but some having high levels in relation to the size of their agricultural 
Box 6: Options for Restraints on Export Credits 
 
•  Limit the term length of export credits 
•  Limit government budgetary outlays for export credits 
•  Consider differential treatment for credits provided to developing countries 31 
sectors. In addition, negotiators will have to consider the method of reductions. Should 
support be reduced  by a given amount or  to a particular level? Reducing support by a 
given amount provides advantages to those countries with currently high levels of 
support. Reducing support t o a particular level would result in a more level playing field 
among countries, but impose greater adjustments on countries with high levels of support. 
The current  de minimis rules specify the level of support in developed and developing 
countries that i s exempt. Negotiators will likely consider whether such exemptions should 
be retained. It could be questioned why  de minimis  thresholds are needed in the AMS 
rules but not in other parts of the URAA. Such a provision does not save time and effort: 
calculating and monitoring of the AMS is still needed to justify a de minimis claim. If this 
provision is maintained, the issue is to determine whether and by how much (or to what 
level) the  de minimis threshold will be reduced. Some countries have proposed that 
developing countries should be allowed to increase the level of support provided under 
the de minimis provision.  
AMS commitments and levels are reported in nominal terms. High inflation or 
fluctuations in exchange rates distort the evaluation of support levels. Negotiators should 
consider the development of criteria that account for inflation or exchange rate 
fluctuations in determining a country’s AMS level. 
Since the URAA was implemented, a number of countries have shifted significant 
portions of their domestic support from the non-exempt category into the Green and Blue 
Box categories. One issue that this raises is whether all domestic policies currently 
categorized as exempt truly fit the criteria of the current agreement. The next agreement 
may seek more specific criteria to determine the status of domestic support policies. 
Specifically, the issue of decoupled payments must be addressed and appropriate criteria 
developed.  
As the Agreement currently exists, countries have the flexibility to adjust the l evel of 
support among products in the Amber Box, provided that the Total AMS does not exceed 
their commitment. Setting AMS limits on a product-specific basis would increase the 
discipline of the Agreement. 
2.  Future Role of the Blue Box 
The intent of the Blue Box category in the URAA was to make it easier for the EU and 
the U.S. to meet their domestic support reduction commitments. Some argue that the Blue 
Box was transitional and should be phased out, thus encouraging countries to adopt 
measures that fit Green Box criteria. Blue box payments are not included in the AMS 
calculation and are exempt from reduction commitments. However, there exists the 
possibility of output and trade impacts from Blue Box policies, and hence a desire by 
exporting countries to discipline these. The key issues concerning the Blue Box are 
whether it should be eliminated, and if so, at what rate.  
3.  Limits on Green Box Subsidies 
The URAA placed no limits on the level of support that can be provided within the Green 
Box framework, which i s supposed to include measures that have no, or at most minimal, 
trade-distorting effects or effects on production. The two basic criteria are that support 32 
must be government-funded (not involving transfers from consumers), and must not have 
the effect of  providing price support to producers. A number of policy-specific criteria 
and conditions also apply. However, the less-than-precise nature of the criteria has left 
considerable room for interpretation on allowable Green Box policies. Beyond the 
clarification of acceptable Green Box policies, several countries have called for limits to 
be imposed on the amount of support provided. While limiting Green Box expenditures 
will be a contentious issue, an area of compromise could involve improved definition of 
policies that have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production. 
4.  Role of the Peace Clause 
The peace clause provides an incentive for countries to shift domestic policy instruments 
towards the Green Box category in order to eliminate the threat of countervailing duties 
and other actions. One question concerning the future of the peace clause is the form that 
it should take to encourage the greatest shift toward qualifying support. Should the clause 
be permanent or of limited duration? Should it only cover Green Box policies or include 
other support? If the peace clause were allowed to expire, would this eliminate much of 
the incentive to shift from non-qualifying to qualifying support categories? The outcome 
concerning the peace clause and its optimal form will depend on changes that take place 
with respect to the various categories of support. 
 
D. Options for Food Aid 
The most prominent food aid program that operates on a concessional basis, using 
subsidized credit, is the U.S. PL 480 Title I Program. This has the stated goal of 
promoting U.S. agricultural exports. Negotiators should consider moving Title I from 
food aid to export credits. As mentioned in the discussion on export credits, such 
programs are also mandated to provide terms favorable for least-developed and net food-
importing countries. Negotiating the PL 480 Title I in the context of export credit 
Box 7: Options for Restraints on Domestic Support 
 
•  Reduce AMS by no less than the UR cuts and consider setting limits on a product-
specific basis to a particular level 
•  Assess relevance of maintaining de minimis provisions, especially for developed 
countries 
•  Impose constraints on Blue Box expenditures and clarify provisions on production 
limiting requirements  
•  Establish clearer criteria for acceptable minimally-trade-distorting instruments in the 
Green Box 
•  Consider eliminating the Peace Clause or confining its provisions to Green Box 
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negotiations may meet both donor and recipient country desire to eliminate unclear 
distinctions between food aid programs and export credit programs. 
A tighter definition of food aid is not likely to make a significant difference to the degree 
to which food aid disrupts world markets (unless it ensures additionality). However, if all 
donors were to abide by common definitions of  food aid, it might be easier for 
agricultural exporters to tolerate a small price-depressing effect associated with food aid. 
If the criteria adopted were successful in targeting food aid to countries in need, those 
countries would benefit from a more effective use of available supplies. 
 
Food aid may at times be used as an export subsidy to reduce unwanted surpluses. The 
most explicit form this takes is when aid is tied to the requirement that the recipient 
source its imports from the donor. The URAA prohibited this. However, the Agreement 
did not discipline more implicit subsidies, such as those for which disciplines are being 
sought by the European Union. Adequate (increased) levels of food aid guaranteed in 
advance by donors and delivered through the World Food Program would solve some of 
the problems. The WTO might also want to consider establishing a Food Financing 
Facility similar to that proposed by several developing countries that would provide a 
short-term safety net for importing countries facing  difficulty in financing normal 
commercial requirements of basic foodstuffs.  Such a fund might increase the confidence 
of countries facing adjustments because of a more liberal agricultural trading 
environment. 
But recognition should also be given to two i mmediate difficulties facing the discussion 
of food aid in the WTO.  First, disciplines for food aid need to be discussed in a venue 
that recognizes the tradeoffs between the adequacy of food and the need for disciplines 
on the export subsidy element of food aid.  Secondly, food aid issues need to be discussed 
in a venue where food aid recipients share power over the decisions.  Neither the WTO, 
nor existing multilateral institutions concerned with food aid, appear to fulfill both 
requirements. 
E. Options for Reforms in State Trading 
A review of the various negotiating proposals indicates that the definition of State 
Trading Enterprises is in urgent need of clarification. Concerns have been raised about 
the monopsony and monopoly power exercised by these entities. Similarly, their ability to 
use price-discrimination among markets and to engage in price pooling are being 
challenged in the WTO, especially in the face of a lack of transparency in the operations 
Box 8: Options for Reform in Food Aid 
§ Identify transactions that are not acceptable as food aid; subject these to strict 
notification and consultation requirements and to overall limits 
§ Improve notification protocols under the Consultative Committee on Surplus 
Disposal (CSSD) and make this information easily accessible     
§ Exercise caution in new disciplines for food aid that could result in a reduction of 
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of STEs. In many countries, STEs are charged with achieving a broad set of domestic 
policy goals. To the extent that domestic constituencies support these goals, there can be 
high political costs for national governments in abandoning these institutions.
26 In some 
cases the outcome of the politically costly process of reform has been the implementation 
of new methods to achieve the same domestic policy goals. In other cases, private 
monopolies have entered the market, such that concerns about market power, 
transparency and price discrimination have not been alleviated. Rents are captured by 
private firms, and are not passed on to producers. 
F. Options for Special and Differential Treatment 
One of the lessons of the Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in 2000 is that the developing 
countries are unwilling to participate in another round of trade negotiations in which their 
views are not fully considered (Stiglitz, 2000). It is important to stress that the developing 
countries are not a homogeneous block. Several developing country food exporters are 
members of the Cairns Group and as such, share that group’s aim of rapid agricultural 
trade liberalization. Conversely, developing country food importers remain skeptical of 
the benefits of opening their domestic agricultural markets. However, all developing 
countries share three major concerns with the current trading system: the structure of the 
WTO; the perceived lack of benefits from the UR negotiations; and that special rules and 
disciplines for developing countries must be put in place during the current round of 
negotiations. 
Developing countries dominate the membership of the WTO; since the conclusion of the 
UR roughly 40 new developing country members have been added. Despite their 
majority position, most developing countries feel that important debates and decisions at 
the WTO take place without their full participation. As stated by the former U. S. Trade 
Representative, Ambassador Barshefsky, following the Seattle Ministerial: "the WTO has 
outgrown the processes appropriate to an earlier time...We needed a process which had a 
greater degree of internal transparency and inclusion to accommodate a larger and more 
diverse membership." The WTO has responded to some of these concerns by making 
most WTO documents publicly available, and by providing technical assistance and 
training for developing country representatives. It is not the mandate of this paper to 
                                                 
26 In the Canadian case, support exists on the part of some producers for elimination of the Canadian Wheat 
Board.  
Box 9: Options for Reforms in State Trading 
 
•  Consider market power issues in the context of broader competition policy 
•  Evaluate if the current WTO dispute resolution system is adequate to investigate 
violation of commitments by STEs 
•  If further disciplines are enacted, consider differential treatment for developing 
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discuss WTO institutional reform, but this remains a key issue in making developing 
countries an integral part of the decision making process.  
Many developing countries feel the benefits promised to them as a result of the UR 
agreement have not been forthcoming. Their list of grievances is long and only a partial 
review is provided here. First, with respect to market access they feel they have not 
benefited to the degree expected from the liberalization of developed country markets for 
agriculture, clothing and textiles. Further, they fear that when they do become 
competitive in developed country markets, they are subjected to anti-dumping actions 
that are generally too  costly for them to block effectively. They also realize that because 
of the UR agreement, their domestic markets continue to face competition from 
agricultural products exported by developed countries with the aid of export subsidies. In 
addition, their domestic support for agriculture is largely constrained to de minimus levels 
as a result of the URAA, while developed countries continue to pour huge sums of money 
into their domestic agricultural sectors through the amber, green and blue boxes. Poor 
developing countries feel they have no chance to compete effectively in agricultural 
markets against the deep pockets of the rich and powerful countries of the world. Finally, 
developing countries fear the inclusion of environmental and labor standards in trade 
agreements. 
For many developing countries, border measures are the only policy instrument available 
to provide income support to their farmers. Unlike developed countries, taxpayer funded 
support measures are not an option given budget realities. This provides one rationale for 
allowing developing countries to retain some water in their tariffs and to have access to a 
special agricultural safeguard mechanism. 
These are the concerns that negotiators face as they attempt to develop rules for special 
and differential treatment of developing countries. Many of the poorest developing 
countries have 60 percent or more of their labor force in agriculture, and agriculture often 
accounts for more than 40 percent of their GDP. However, developing countries have a 
large stake in trade liberalization given that 43 percent of developing countries are net 
agricultural exporters, including 28 of the world’s poorest countries (McCalla, 2001). 
Preferential treatment in market access involves the same issues as broader market 
access. The level of tariffs and their dispersion should be dealt with using a 
harmonization formula. However, the effects of liberalization will be asymmetric for 
developing countries since they will retain greater levels of protection while receiving 
preferential access to developed country markets. Harmonization formulas, like the Swiss 
formula, could be used with different parameters for liberalizing both developing and 
developed country tariffs.  
With respect to market access, the EU recently approved a  proposal to eliminate tariffs 
and quotas on all products, except arms, from the world's 48 poorest countries. The 
adoption of this policy by the EU will put considerable pressure on other developed 
countries to follow suit. In addition, developing countries other than the 48 included in 
the EU scheme are sure to press for similar treatment. 
Developed countries should be prepared to grant developing countries major tariff 
concessions on all agricultural products, including those that are import sensitive, d uring 
this round of negotiations. In return, developing countries should agree to liberalize their 36 
own agricultural markets, and a longer transition period for tariff reductions could be 
provided. Developing countries should agree to pursue their non-trade concerns using 
instruments that are consistent with less border protection. This approach may require 
additional financial aid from developed countries, and perhaps even new international 
institutions. However, the provision of some additional financial s upport to address non-
trade concerns in developing countries is a small price to pay for obtaining meaningful 
reductions in agricultural trade barriers. 
The creation of a special developing country safeguard may be a consideration for the 
large number of d eveloping country products for which the bound rate substantially 
exceeds the applied tariff. Special treatment in terms of bindings should be addressed 
with a safeguard measure and not through the tariff system. 
 
Developing countries have been afforded s pecial and differential treatment under the 
URAA for domestic support. These include a smaller reduction commitment, higher  de 
minimis level, longer implementation period, and exemption for the least developed 
countries from all reduction commitments. The  continuation of these special and 
differential treatments seems appropriate. In addition to determining what special and 
differential treatment will be granted, the current negotiations should develop specific 
criteria on which WTO members will qualify as  developing countries. The application of 
special and differential treatment to transition economies will also need to be addressed. 
G. Options for Further Action on Product Attributes 
The existence of trade restrictions based on product attributes has emerged as an 
important issue in the WTO.  The current round of agriculture negotiations has been 
characterized as one in which governments are seeking additional latitude, discipline, or 
clarity with respect to their multilateral commitments regarding product attribute 
regulations.  Proposals that seek additional latitude for policy interventions could 
potentially unravel the modest regulatory reforms of the Uruguay Round.  To the extent 
that the negotiations provide more latitude for developed countries to respond to revealed 
Box 10. Options for Special and Differential Treatment 
 
•  Continue to promote preferential access for developing countries through 
preferential tariffs in developed countries 
•  Reduce tariffs in developing countries using a harmonization approach, but allow a 
longer transition period for reductions  
•  Include smaller reduction commitments on domestic support, a higher de minimis 
level, and longer implementation period 
•  Add to the specific green box criteria for WTO members who qualify as developing 
countries 
•  Address developing country concerns about trade liberalization through increased 
technical assistance and financial aid  37 
or perceived domestic demands for product standards, the goal of the WTO should be to 
ensure that this latitude does not limit trade. Some of the calls for additional regulatory 
latitude appear to be designed with other social goals in mind, and to this extent are 
disingenuous when cast as questions of regulatory policy related to product attributes.  
Developing countries have also requested additional latitude in fulfilling their obligations 
under the agreements.  These concerns are best addressed with increased technical 
assistance that promotes their integration into the world economy, rather than special and 
differential exemptions that delay it.    
Proposals to strengthen current WTO rules by requiring proportional policy responses to 
risks, limiting deviations from international standards, or otherwise tightening the criteria 
for a legitimate product regulation could move countries closer to optimal economic 
policies, but at the cost of some political capital.  Debate over regulation that limits trade 
is usually part of a larger contest over all regulation that is often vigorously debated 
within sovereign states, let alone between them.  Within this larger debate, economics 
recommends the merit of market-based solutions over rigid command  and control rules, 
careful assessments of the costs of regulation, and weighing the costs against the benefits 
of a proposed measure.  But because product attribute regulations in many instances 
address market failures in order to achieve greater consumer welfare, it is one area where 
consumers do not gain unambiguously from trade.  This creates a different political 
economy for WTO negotiations: tighter disciplines on product attribute regulation will 
meet with political resistance from some consumer groups, in addition to protected 
producers.  
The case for clarifying current multilateral rules, rather than changing them, is strong.  
There is widespread agreement that the promise of some innovative Uruguay Round 
initiatives, such as equivalence and regionalization, has not yet been fulfilled.  The causes 
of failure need to be diagnosed, perhaps with the assistance of the international standards 
organizations, before effective remedies can be prescribed.  The “new issues” raised in 
many proposals also merit f urther debate. Simply dismissing as protectionist any 
initiative to discuss such issues such as the regulation of production and processing 
methods or labeling regimes not only hardens opposition to further trade liberalization 
among some constituency groups, it also squanders an important opportunity to examine 
how trade can contribute to providing consumers with desired products in the most cost-
effective manner.  The whole attributes/trade debate could constructively be turned to 
shift the focus from expanded trade as a threat to desired product attributes to expanded 
trade as a resource efficient means to achieve those attributes.  Debate within the standing 
SPS, TBT, and Trade and Environment Committees, rather than the agricultural 
negotiations  per se, should be considered: this option would capitalize on the expertise in 
these committees, reduce the likelihood of divergent solutions for the regulation of 
agricultural and industrial products, and minimize diversion from further liberalization of 
traditional trade barriers which still significantly distort agricultural markets.      38 
 
Progress on these issues will depend on abandoning the polarizing debate over which 
objectives are legitimate, and instead focusing on the requirement that policy regimes 
provide the least trade restrictive means for achieving a stated objective.  A useful first 
step for those who propose increased product attribute regulations would be to identify, 
for example, how production and processing method regulations can be formulated so 
that  all producers have the opportunity to compete in markets. Regulatory proposals that 
advance measures not coincidentally favorable toward domestic producers, or that 
include technical assistance for developing countries to enter marketing channels, or that 
consider independent, third-party certification, could help dispel suspicion that consumer 
concerns are addressed only when it is politically expedient to do so. Those who favor 
less national regulation about product attributes are likewise challenged to offer  
explanations and examples of when and how the market, or the market in tandem with 
limited government intervention, provides optimal (and often more agile) solutions to 
matching product availability with evolving consumer preferences. Refusal to engage in 
this debate will not forestall consumers’ interest in certain product quality attributes; 
indeed, those who wish to export to some markets have already found that the 
requirements of private firms exceed those found in WTO negotiating proposals. 
V. Negotiation Outcomes 
The packaging of possible outcomes in the agricultural negotiations has to reflect balance 
in at least four different dimensions. First and foremost, it has to meet the major 
aspirations of both developed and developing countries. The events at the WTO meeting 
in Seattle showed that developing countries are not about to agree to a negotiating 
conclusion that ignores their interests. Proposals by the developing countries make 
explicit their concerns and those in the developed world have indicated a willingness to 
take them into account. But an acceptable package will need to have substantial market 
access in products of interest to developing countries; recognition of special development 
needs in domestic policies; some allowance f or safeguard action in the event of market 
disruption; and a stronger commitment to action on food security in times of high world 
Box 11. Options for Regulations on Product Attributes  
 
•  Focus future international efforts on implementing the Uruguay Round reforms 
related to equivalence and regionalization 
•  Capitalize on the expertise of the standing SPS, TBT and Trade and 
Environment Committees to clarify existing multilateral rules related to new 
cross-cutting issues such as mandatory labeling of production processes and the 
precautionary principle 
•  Provide technical assistance to developing countries to strengthen their 
regulatory regimes so that they can both gain greater access to foreign markets 
for their products and fulfill their obligations under the agreements 
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prices. In turn, developed countries will expect full involvement by developing countries 
in the market opening commitments a nd some further restrictions on the activities of state 
trading importing agencies. This package would be easier to achieve in the context of a 
round that extends beyond agriculture because other benefits such as improved market 
access in the textiles area could be included, along with better access for developed 
countries to the markets for manufactured products in the developing countries.  
Second, the package has to be balanced between importing and exporting countries. In 
spite of the restraints on export subsidies agreed in the Uruguay Round, the feeling is 
widespread that exporters have had to make less painful adjustments as a result of that 
agreement. Exporters may feel that the major problems of agricultural trade are the fault 
of protectionist importers, but the importing countries have always claimed that their own 
policies reflect the need to be protected against erratic world prices that are depressed by 
the activities of the exporters. Whatever the merits of these arguments, it is unlikely that a 
deal could be struck on this occasion if the only changes in export policy were further 
reductions in the EU’s export subsidies. Australia and New Zealand may be excused from 
“pain” in the final package, but the Canada and the United States will not be a ble to 
escape so lightly. The EU is also a major exporter, but in many ways acts as an importer 
of temperate zone commodities. A change in trade policy strategy from a defensive to an 
offensive approach has been slow in the EU. There are signs that the EU  is finally 
beginning to argue for open markets rather than insist on the right to keep these markets 
protected. A key to the current talks may be the extent to which this attitude is manifest in 
the EU’s behavior in the negotiations.
27 
A third aspect of the package is the balance among commodities. It is well understood 
that the Uruguay Round left some commodities, notably sugar and dairy products, 
virtually untouched. In contrast, serious discussions were held on virtually free markets 
for oilseeds. Some countries are in favor of trying again with zero-for-zero agreements, 
which could have the effect of exacerbating distortions across agricultural markets.
28 The 
question is whether this round of talks can conclude without significant liberalization in 
dairy a nd sugar markets. The answer is shrouded in the domestic politics of the EU and 
the U.S., but the Cairns Group could also have a say in this. Australia and New Zealand 
have a strong incentive to see that dairy trade is not treated lightly in this round. Dairy 
markets have shown some signs of recovering from the disarray caused by unrestricted 
export subsidies, but they are still distorted by high tariffs. Further domestic reforms by 
the EU and a continuation of the moves toward a more liberal policy on dairy products in 
the U.S. could set the scene for a significant degree of liberalization in this sector. 
The same may not be true in the sugar market. Low cost suppliers, particularly Australia 
and Brazil, will push hard for sugar to be included in the tariff reductions in the round. 
However, some developing countries benefit from preferential access for this product into 
EU and U.S. markets, which complicates negotiations on market access. 
                                                 
27 It is ironic, if not inexplicable, that the EU country with the most defensive position with respect to the 
talks (France) is also one of the main agricultural exporters in the EU. Presumably the change of heart 
mentioned here is largely dependent on changes in French policy, which could come after the next election. 
28 See Josling and Rae (1999) for a discussion of the drawbacks of sectoral imbalances. 40 
The fourth element is balance among the various parts of the package.  The balance 
among instruments is difficult to define. Clearly some of the measures are connected: we 
know that lower tariffs will restrict the ability of countries to use export subsidies, reduce 
the potential trade diversion impacts of free trade areas and cut the quota rents from 
TRQs. But there are also links between the use of safeguards by importing countries and 
the control of export subsidies. It is likely that the market access and export competition 
components will have to be considered as a whole  and a reasonable balance achieved. 
Less obvious is the connection between domestic support and product attributes. One 
deals with disciplines on the attempt by countries to pursue domestic policy in rural 
areas, and the other with disciplines on domestic q uality and safety regulations. In each 
case, the issues are the extent to which the domestic policies can be reformulated to have 
less impact on other countries, and the way in which one can prevent capture of these 
domestic regulations by those seeking to protect domestic producers. Again, a balance 
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